《不确定性联盟形成中基于信念的稳定性(智能代理的视角英文版)(精)》由陈志江、梁浩锋所著，供相关读者阅读参考。This book is organised as follows.

In Chapter 1, we first provide an introduction of topics in game theory that are relevant to the concepts discussed in this book. In Chapter 2, we review some relevant works from the literature, espe-cially in cooperative game theory and multi-agent coalition formation problems. In Chapter 3, we discuss the effect of uncertainty in the agent's beliefs on the stability of the games. A rule-based approach is adopted and the concepts of strong core and weak core are intro-duced. We also discuss the effect of precision of the beliefs on the stability of the coalitions. In Chapter 4, we introduce private beliefs in non-transferable utility (NTU) games, so that the preferences of the agents are no longer common knowledge. The impact of belief accuracy on stability is also examined.…

Chapter 1 Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability

1.1 Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems

   1.1.1 Characteristics of Multi-agent Systems

   1.1.2 Two Basic Solution Concepts of Coalition

       Formations

1.2 Coalition Formation and Game Theory

   1.2.1 Transferable Utility Games

   1.2.2 Non-transferable Utility Games

1.3 Problem with the Common Knowledge Assumption

References

Chapter 2 Non-transferable Utility Games and

       Coalition Formation Mechanisms

2.1 Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games

2.2 Transferable Utility Cooperative Games

2.3 Coalition Formation Mechanisms

2.4 Belief and Uncertainties

References

Chapter 3 Two Classes of Stability

       -- Strong Core and Weak Core

3.1 Coalition Formation and Stability

3.2 An Example

3.3 NTU Games with Internal Uncertainty

3.4 Opinions and Preferences of Agents

3.5 The Strong Core and the Weak Core

3.6 Effect of Refinedness of Agent Opinions

3.7 Application Areas

3.8 Summary

References

Chapter 4 The b-Core: Belief-based Coalition

       Stability

4.1 Games Without Common Knowledge

4.2 Belief-based Coalitional Games

4.3 NTU Games with Private Beliefs

4.4 The Core, the b-Core and Belief Accuracy

4.5 Discussion

4.6 On Dynamic Beliefs

4.7 Summary

References

Chapter 5 Example Application of the b-Core:

       Buyer Coalition Problem with Beliefs

5.1 Buyer Coalition Problems

   5.1.1 Are the Utility Really Transferable?

   5.1.2 How About Stability?

   5.1.3 Private Information in Buyer Coalition

   5.1.4 Existing Approaches

   5.1.5 A New Approach

5.2 Background of Buyer Coalition Problem

   5.2.1 Unit Price Schedule and Agent Preference

   5.2.2 Agent Beliefs

   5.2.3 NTU Buyer Coalition Games

   5.2.4 Properties of the b-Core in NTU-Buyer

        Games

   5.2.5 On Mechanism Design

5.3 A Distributed Mechanism

   5.3.1 Distributed Non-transferable Utility Coalition

       Formation Mechanism

   5.3.2 An Example of the Mechanism

5.4 Experiment

   5.4.1 Performance of the Mechanism

   5.4.2 Evidence of Incentive Compatibility

5.5 Summary

References

Chapter 6 The Complete Picture: sb-Core and

      wb-Core

6.1 Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs

6.2 An Illustrating Example

6.3 NTU-BU Games

   6.3.1 Preferences and Beliefs in NTU-BU Games

   6.3.2 NTU-BU Games Stability

6.4 Properties

   6.4.1 Relationships of the Four Criteria

   6.4.2 Effect of Refinedness

   6.4.3 Effect of Accuracy

6.5 Summary

References

Chapter 7 Conclusion

7.1 New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU

   Games

7.2 The Future

References

Book References

Index