《道德情操论》是亚当·斯密的伦理学著作，他一生中共修订过六次。斯密从人类的情感和同情心出发，讨论了善恶、美丑、正义、责任等一系列概念，进而揭示出人类社会赖以维系、和谐发展的秘密。

在本书中，斯密继承了以《沉思录》为代表的斯多葛学派的道德哲学思想，把“内心平静”而不是“物质享乐”看作人生幸福的重要标志，将人性中利他和利己这两种本性有机地结合在一起，为之后出版的《国富论》奠定了道德哲学的基础。《道德情操论》相比《国富论》给西方世界带来的影响更为深远，它对于促进人类福利这一更大的社会目的起到了更为基本的作用，是市场经济良性运行不可或缺的“圣经”，堪称西方世界的《论语》。

1 Part I

 1.1 Of the Sense of Propriety

1.1.1 Of Sympathy

1.1.2 Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy

1.1.3 Of the Manner in which we judge of the Propriety or Im-

 propriety of the Affections of other Men, by their concord

 or dissonance with out own

1.1.4 The same Subject continued

1.1.5 Of the amiable and respectable Virtues

 1.2 Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety

1.2.1 Of the Passions which take their origin from the Body

1.2.2 Of those Passions which take their origin from a partic-ular turn or habit of the Imagination

1.2.3 Of the Unsocial Passions

1.2.4 Of the Social Passions

1.2.5 Of the Selfish Passions

 1.3 Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment

 of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and 'why it

 is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state than

 in the other

1.3.1 That though our sympathy with Sorrow is generally a

 more lively sensation than our sympathy with Joy, it

 commonly falls much more short of the violence of what

 is naturally felt by the person principally concerned 

1.3.2 Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks

1.3.3 Of the corruption of our Moral Sentiments, which is oc-

 casioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the

 great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean

 condition

2 Part II

 2.1 Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit

2.1.1 That whatever appears to be the proper object of grat-

 itude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same

 manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment appears to deserve punishment

2.1.2 Of the proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment

2.1.3 That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the

 person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy,

 with the gratitude of him who receives it; and that, on the

 contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives

 of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of

 sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it

2.1.4 Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters

2.1.5 The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit

 2.2 Of Justice and Beneficence

2.2.1 Comparison of those two Virtues

2.2.2. Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the conscious-

  ness of Merit

2.2.3 Of the utility of this constitution of Nature

 2.3 Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind,

with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions

2.3.1 Of the Causes of this Influence of Fortune

2.3.2 Of the Extent of this Influence of Fortune

2.3.3 Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments

3 Part III

3.1 Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation

3.2 Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame,

and of that of Blame-worthiness

3.3 Of the Influences and Authority of Conscience

3.4 Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules

3.5 Of the Influence and Authority of the general Rules of Morality,

and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity

3.6 In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole Principle

of our Conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other

Motives

4 Part IV

 4.1 Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon

all the Productions of Art, and of the extensive Influence of this

Species of Beauty

 4.2 Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon

the Characters and Actions of Men; and how far the Perception

of this Beauty may be regarded as one of the original Principles

of Approbation

5 Part V

 5.1 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our notions of

Beauty and Deformity

 5.2 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments

6 Part VI

 6.1 Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own

Happiness; or of Prudence

 6.2 Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the

Happiness of other People

6.2.1 Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by

Nature to our care and attention

6.2.2 Of the Order in which Societies are by nature recommended to our Beneficence

6.2.3 Of Universal Benevolence

 6.3 Of Self-command

7 Part VII

 7.1 Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of

Moral Sentiments

 7.2 Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue

7.2.1 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety

7.2.2 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence

7.2.3 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence

7.2.4 Of Licentious Systems

 7.3 Of the Different Systems which have been Formed Concerning

the Principle of Approbation

7.3.1 Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love

7.3.2 Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation

7.3.3 Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation

 7.4 Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the

practical Rules of Morality